English v Mentor Corp by unknown
1995 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-29-1995 
English v Mentor Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 
Recommended Citation 
"English v Mentor Corp" (1995). 1995 Decisions. 261. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/261 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1995 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
      
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD COURT 
           
 
No. 94-1714 
           
 
HUGH EDWARD ENGLISH, III; LORRAINE ENGLISH, 
                              Appellants 
 
v. 
 
MENTOR CORPORATION 
           
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 93-02725) 
           
 
Argued January 12, 1995 
 
Before:  COWEN, NYGAARD and ALITO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  September 29, 1995) 
 
BARBARA M. DALY, ESQUIRE (Argued) 
Jaffe & Hough 
15th & J.F.K. Boulevard 
1907 Two Penn Center Plaza 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
Attorney for Appellants 
 
HOWARD M. CYR, III, ESQUIRE (Argued) 
DAVID J. GRIFFITH, ESQUIRE 
Harvey, Pennington, Herting & Renneisen 
1835 Market Street 
Eleven Penn Center, 29th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
Attorney for Appellee 
 
JEFFREY R. WHITE, ESQUIRE 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America 
1050 31st Street, N.W. 
2 
Washington, DC 20007-4499 
Attorney for Amicus-Appellant 
 
RICHARD A. SAMP, ESQUIRE 
Washington Legal Foundation 
2009 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20036 
Attorney for Amicus-Appellee 
           
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Hugh and Lorraine English sued Mentor Corporation, 
alleging claims based upon strict product liability, negligence, 
breach of express and implied warranty, loss of consortium by 
Mrs. English, and punitive damages.  Mr. English had a Mentor 
inflatable penile prosthesis implanted.  The device malfunctioned 
and appellants sued Mentor in the Pennsylvania Court of Common 
Pleas.  Mentor removed the case to the federal district court, 
which granted summary judgment in its favor, holding that 
appellants' claims were preempted by the Medical Device 
Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 360c-360rr.     
 Appellants raise two issues on appeal:  (1) whether the 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 preempt their state law tort 
and contract claims against the manufacturer of a Class III 
medical device; and (2) whether the Amendments also preempt these 
claims for a medical device cleared for marketing under the 
"substantial equivalence" exception to the general rule requiring 
3 
a full Premarket Approval process.  We will affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand the cause. I. 
 The Medical Device Amendments classify medical devices 
as Class I, II or III devices, depending upon their potential 
danger to the public.  Class III devices are the most dangerous, 
the most heavily regulated, and include the prosthesis implanted 
in Mr. English.  Generally with Class III devices, the 
manufacturer must submit a detailed "Premarket Approval" 
application to the FDA, 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1), and obtain 
Premarket Approval before they can be marketed to the public. Id. 
§ 360c(a)(1)(C). 
 There are two exceptions to this requirement.  First, 
Class III devices may receive an "Investigational Device 
Exemption" (or "IDE") from the FDA, id. § 360j(g), which permits 
the device to be tested on human subjects without obtaining 
Premarket Approval.  Id. § 360e(a).  Second, absent formal 
premarket approval, the FDA has permitted manufacturers to market 
new inflatable penile implants by completing the "510(k) 
procedure," which requires a demonstration that the new device is 
"substantially equivalent" to other penile implants already on 
the market before the passage of the MDA.1  21 U.S.C. 
                                                           
1In adopting the MDA, Congress drew a distinction between devices 
that were on the market before its passage (and devices 
"substantially equivalent" to these devices) and devices marketed 
after its passage in 1976.  Congress realized that it was 
impracticable to require that devices that were already on the 
market be withdrawn until they obtained premarket approval from 
the FDA.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360e.  Instead, Congress directed the 
FDA to promulgate regulations to allow manufacturers of these 
devices to move gradually into compliance with the MDA.  Id. This 
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§360c(f)(3); 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.81-807.100.  Absent such a 
demonstration, a device may not be marketed until obtaining the 
full premarket approval described above. 
 Under this 510(k) procedure, the FDA must decide 
whether a new device is in fact substantially equivalent to a 
device already on the market prior to 1976.  See 21 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
authority also extended to new devices "substantially equivalent" 
to devices on the market as of 1976.  Id. 
 
 The FDA relied on this distinction as authorization for 
its 510(k) process.  Thus, the FDA has issued regulations, such 
as 21 C.F.R. § 876, classifying certain preexisting devices 
(including inflatable penile implants) as Class III devices, but 
exempting them from immediate premarket approval (by postponing 
the date the regulations become effective).  The FDA also allows 
substantial equivalents of these devices to be marketed before 
obtaining final premarket approval--by completing the 510(k) 
process.  Id. at §§ 807.81-807.100.  These devices, however, are 
required to obtain premarket approval in the future.  See 21 
C.F.R. § 870.1-870.3.  New devices (i.e. devices not in existence 
before 1976 or substantially equivalent to such a device) must 
receive premarket approval before they may be marketed.  21 
U.S.C. § 360e(a); 21 C.F.R. § 870.3. 
 
 With the passage of the Safe Medical Devices Act 
("SMDA") in 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, Congress explicitly 
codified these 510(k) procedures.  See H.Rep. No. 101-808, 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6319 ("Section 4(b) [of 
the SMDA] codifies the FDA's current practice regarding the use 
of the 510(k) procedure for entering the market.").  The current 
approach is found at 26 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(3), which explicitly 
allows a manufacturer of a Class III device, for which no final 
regulation requiring premarket approval has been promulgated, to 
market the device by complying with the FDA's 510(k) notification 
process.  Similarly, the SMDA codified the FDA's definition of 
substantial equivalence.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A).  Because 
Congress in the SMDA codified FDA procedures in place at the time 
the device implanted into English was approved by the FDA 
pursuant to the 510(k) process, we make reference to its 
provisions in determining the extent to which the FDA has 
regulated the device. 
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§360c(f)(3).  Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A), a device is 
considered "substantially equivalent" if the device: 
(i) has the same technological 
characteristics as the predicate device, or 
 
(ii)(I) has different technological 
characteristics and information submitted 
that the device is substantially equivalent 
to the predicate device contains information, 
including clinical data if deemed necessary 
by the Secretary, that demonstrates that the 
device is as safe and effective as a legally 
marketed device, and (II) does not raise 
different questions of safety and efficacy 
than the predicate device. 
 
This substantial equivalence determination therefore requires the 
manufacturer to provide information to the FDA in order to ensure 
that "the device is safe, effective and performs as well as or 
better than the [predicate] device...."  21 C.F.R. § 807.95; see 
21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 807.92. 
 The FDA, however, views the 510(k) exception as an 
intermediate step to obtaining full premarket approval.  The FDA 
will eventually require all Class III devices to obtain full 
premarket approval.2   
                                                           
2Congress has directed the FDA to clear up the backlog of devices 
that are classified as Class III, but for which the FDA has not 
issued a final regulation requiring premarket approval. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360e(i).  Congress was concerned that the FDA was using the 
510(k) process as a means to avoid having to issue premarket 
approval on a wide array of devices.  See H.Rep. No. 101-808, 
101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6317-
20.  Under § 360e(i), manufacturers of these Class III devices 
will have to submit information pertaining to their performance, 
including safety and effectiveness data.  The FDA will then be 
required promptly to re-categorize these devices as Class II 
devices or finally issue regulations requiring that they obtain 
premarket approval.  Id. 
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 Before Mr. English's prosthesis was inserted, the FDA 
determined that Mentor's prosthesis was substantially equivalent 
to other Class III devices marketed before the Amendments, and 
allowed Mentor to market its prosthesis to the public without 
Premarket Approval.  The FDA had initially granted an 
Investigational Device Exemption to Mentor, permitting it to test 
its prosthesis on human subjects; English, however, did not 
receive a device as part of an IDE test study and thus Mentor 
cannot rely on IDE regulations in support of its argument that 
English's state tort claims are preempted. 
II. 
 Appellants argue first that Congress never intended the 
Amendments to preempt state law claims.  We rejected that 
argument in Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994); see also Michael v. 
Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995).  The preemption 
provision provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b)3 of 
this section, no State or political 
 subdivision of a state may establish or 
continue in effect with respect to a device 
intended for human use any requirement--  
 
(1) which is different from, or in addition 
to, any requirement applicable under this 
chapter to the device, and  
 
(2) which relates to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device or to any other 
                                                           
3Subsection (b) permits a state to apply for an exemption from 
the preemption of subsection (a) for certain state laws.  No such 
application was made in this case, thus subsection (b) is not at 
issue. 
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matter included in a requirement applicable 
to the device under this chapter. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
 We opined in Gile that Congress' use of the word 
"requirement" in § 360k(a) adequately expresses its intent to 
preempt state law claims that would impose different or 
additional requirements from those under federal law.  22 F.2d at 
542-43.  We held that § 360k(a) preempted state law strict 
liability and negligence claims as impermissible attempts to 
impose additional safety or effectiveness requirements on medical 
device manufacturers.  Id. at 545.  In Michael, we held that  
§ 360k(a) also preempts breach of implied warranty claims because 
they too arise under state law.  46 F.3d at 1324-25.   
 Applying Gile and Michael, we hold that the district 
court correctly adjudged appellants' strict liability, 
negligence, and breach of implied warranty claims preempted by  
§ 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments.  Because Gile and 
Michael explain our rationale with respect to these claims, we 
need not. 
  In Michael, we held that breach of express warranty 
claims are not preempted by § 360k(a) because they are created by 
the parties and not by state law.  46 F.3d at 1325-26; see also 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., -- U.S. --, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 
2622 (1992) ("[R]equirements imposed by an express warranty are 
not 'imposed under state law,' but rather imposed by the 
warrantor.").  Again, we are satisfied that our opinion in 
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Michael fully sets forth our analysis.  We will reverse the 
district court's summary judgment on this claim. 
 The remaining claims are for loss of consortium by Mrs. 
English and punitive damages.  We will uphold summary judgment 
with respect to the latter, inasmuch as the Pennsylvania courts 
have held that, absent fraud, punitive damages cannot be awarded 
for a breach of warranty.  See e.g., AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. 
Atlantic Richfield, 526 Pa. 110, 584 A.2d 915, 927 (1992).   
 We have found no Pennsylvania case, however, deciding 
whether a loss of consortium award can be premised upon a breach 
of warranty.  Pennsylvania has made clear that loss of consortium 
cannot be based on pure breach of contract.  E.g., Thorsen v. 
Iron and Glass Bank, 328 Pa. Super. 135, 476 A.2d 928, 932 
(1984).  Other courts, however, have looked to the substance of 
the breach of warranty claim in deciding whether it will support 
a loss of consortium award.  See, e.g., Scarzella v. Saxon, 436 
A.2d 358, 363 (D.C. App. 1981) (allowing loss of consortium 
premised upon breach of warranty and citing W. Prosser, Law of 
Torts § 95, at 635 (4th ed. 1971) for the proposition that 
warranty actions have historically sounded in tort as well as 
contract); Fernandez v. Union Bookbinding Co., Inc., 400 Mass. 
27, 507 N.E.2d 728, 735 (1987) (same); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck 
and & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 608 A.2d 1276, 1284, cert. denied, 
328 Md. 447, 614 A.2d 973 (1992) (same); Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 100-102 (1960) (same).   
 Appellants' breach of express warranty claim seeks 
damages for personal injuries, which are recoverable in 
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Pennsylvania as consequential damages for breach of warranty.  13 
Pa.C.S.A. § 2715(b)(2).  Given the substance of appellants' 
warranty claim and that "a consortium claim is inextricably 
intertwined with the underlying action for personal injury...[,]" 
Novelli v. Johns-Manville Corp., 395 Pa. Super. 144, 576 A.2d 
1085, 1088 (1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 625, 592 A.2d 45 
(1991), we think the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would permit Mrs. 
English to maintain her loss of consortium claim.    
 Finally, appellants argue that the Amendments do not 
preempt their claim that Mentor failed to comply with FDA 
requirements in the design and manufacture of the device.  The 
district court rejected this argument because appellants did not 
properly allege that Mentor failed to comply with FDA regulations 
concerning the manufacturing process.  Appellants point to no 
evidence that would support or create an issue of fact with 
respect to such a claim, even if properly alleged.  We find no 
error in the district court's determination.  See also Mendes v. 
Medtronic, 18 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1994) (refusing to consider 
the same argument where plaintiff's complaint contained no 
allegations of manufacturer's failure to comply with FDA 
requirements). 
III. 
 The second issue raised by appellants is whether  
§ 360k(a) preemption also applies to a Class III medical device 
without Premarket Approval, but cleared for marketing by a 
"substantial equivalence" determination.  To reiterate, a 
manufacturer can bypass the full-blown Premarket Approval process 
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if the FDA determines that the device is substantially equivalent 
to devices on the market before the Amendment became effective in 
1976.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1); see discussion supra part II.   
 FDA regulations require that a manufacturer seeking a 
substantial equivalence determination submit a 510(k) Premarket 
Notification containing "an adequate summary of any information 
respecting [the] safety and effectiveness [of the device] or 
state that such information will be made available upon request 
by any person."  21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3)(A).  The actual summary 
regarding the safety and effectiveness of the device must contain 
"detailed information regarding data concerning adverse health 
effects and shall be made available to the public by the [FDA] 
within 30 days of the issuance of a determination that such 
device is substantially equivalent to another device."  Id. 
§360c(i)(3)(B). 
 Moreover, the FDA regulates both the format and content 
of a 510(k) Notification.  The Notification must include, among 
other things:  any action taken by the manufacturer to comply 
with the Amendment's requirements for performance standards; 
proposed labels, labeling, and advertisements sufficient to 
describe the device, its intended use, and the directions for its 
use; where applicable, photos or engineering drawings of the 
device; a statement that the device is similar to and/or 
different from other products of comparable type, accompanied by 
data to support the statement that may include an identification 
of similar products, materials, design considerations, and a 
description of the operational principles of the device; and any 
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additional information requested by the FDA that is necessary for 
it to make a finding of substantial equivalency.  21 C.F.R. 
§807.87. 
 In addition to the requirements pertaining specifically 
to substantially equivalent devices, the devices are also subject 
to the FDA's "General Controls," which include labeling 
requirements and good manufacturing practices.  Mendes, 18 F.3d 
at 14 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360i, 360j).  The parallel FDA 
regulations on labeling govern the content and appearance of 
prescription medical device labels.  21 C.F.R. §§ 801.1, 801.15, 
801.109.  As the Mendes court noted, these regulations exempt 
such devices from the requirement that there be directions to a 
layperson on how to use the product safely, if the package 
describes, inter alia, "any relevant hazards, contraindications, 
side effects, and precautions" for the prescribing physician. Id. 
at 18 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 801.109).  Furthermore, the FDA has 
promulgated extensive regulations interpreting the Amendment's 
good manufacturing practices requirements.  21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1-
820.198. 
 Only a handful of federal courts have considered 
whether the 510(k) process is a "requirement" that preempts state 
law tort claims under 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).  The majority of them 
hold that it is a requirement.  For example, in Mendes, supra, 
the court held that a FDA determination of substantial 
equivalence carries with it sufficient federal requirements 
relating to safety and effectiveness to preempt state tort 
claims.  Accord Duvall v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. S-93-
12 
1072, 1994 WL 591534 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 1994); Bollier v. 
Medtronic, Inc., No. H-92-2439, 1993 WL 734843 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 
28, 1993); Rutland v. Mentor Corp., No. 20235, 1994 WL 454741 
(Miss. Cir. Feb. 23, 1994).   
 With respect to Mentor's penile implants, the Rutland 
court stated: 
The application procedure under 510(k) 
includes extensive qualification criteria 
based upon clinical studies, drawings and 
procedures in the manufacture of the device, 
proposed labelings and warnings, extensive 
product sterility information and documen-
tation, a comparison to other devices on the 
market and safety and effectiveness status 
based upon ten (10) years of another similar 
device.  Mentor not only complied with the 
510(k) requirements, it continues to comply 
with post-510(k) requirements imposed by law. 
 
Id. at *3. 
 Among the few cases suggesting that the 510(k) process 
does not invoke preemption is Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 
74 Haw. 1, 837 P.2d 1273 (1992) (involving pacemaker).  Larsen 
held that the 510(k) process does not preempt state law claims 
because it does not constitute FDA approval of a device.  Id. at 
1282.  The court cited 21 C.F.R. § 807.97, which states that an 
FDA determination of substantial equivalence "does not in any way 
denote official approval of the device.  Any representation that 
creates an impression of official approval of a device because of 
complying with the [510(k) Notification] regulations is 
misleading and constitutes misbranding."  Id. 
 Nevertheless, we agree with the district court's well-
reasoned rationale that the Amendment's preemption provision is 
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triggered not by FDA approval of a device's safety and 
effectiveness, but by federal requirements relating to a device's 
safety and effectiveness.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).  Those 
regulations include the 510(k) process with which a manufacturer 
must comply to obtain a determination of substantial equivalence. 
We are satisfied that this process is sufficiently rigorous to 
constitute a "requirement...relating to the safety or 
effectiveness" of Class III medical devices, pursuant to 
§360k(a). 
 Implicitly conceding that the FDA regulations discussed 
above do establish safety requirements, English nevertheless 
maintains that only regulations specifically covering inflatable 
penile prostheses have preemptive effect.  In support of this 
argument, English asserts that the FDA has determined that 
preemption only applies when: 
[T]he [FDA] has established specific 
counterpart regulations or there are other 
specific requirements applicable to a 
particular device under the act, thereby 
making any existing divergent State or local 
requirements applicable to the device 
different from, or in addition to, the 
specific [FDA] requirements.  There are other 
State or local requirements that affect 
devices that are not preempted by section 
[360k(a)] of the act because they are "not 
requirements applicable to a device" within 
the meaning of section [360k(a)] of the act. 
 
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (emphasis added).  Indeed, two district 
courts have followed this logic and ruled that preemption occurs 
only when there are specific, but not general, regulations 
pertaining to a device.  Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 
14 
948, 951-53 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 848 F. 
Supp. 905, 906 (D. Colo. 1994). 
 We find this argument unconvincing.  First, English 
attempts to read the phrase "other specific requirements 
applicable to a particular device" out of the statute.  This 
phrase suggests that a general regulation that is binding on a 
particular device has preemptive effect.  See Hodgon v. Mentor 
Corp., No. 92-1429, slip. op. at 5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 1994) 
(finding premarket approval regulations are "specific 
requirements" within meaning of § 808.1(d)); Tucker v. Collagen 
Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3101, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 
1994) (rejecting narrow reading of § 808.1(d)).  Indeed, other 
circuits have relied on FDA regulations generally applicable to 
Class III devices in order to find preemption.  See Mendes, 18 
F.3d at 17-18 (good manufacturing practice and labeling 
requirements); Stamps v. Collagen Corp, 984 F.2d 1416, 1422 n.5 
(5th Cir.) (good manufacturing practice requirements), cert. 
denied, -- U.S. --, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993); King v. Collagen Corp., 
983 F.2d 1130, 1131 (1st Cir.) (premarket approval application 
requirements), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 114 S.Ct. 84 (1993). 
 Second, even assuming that the FDA's regulations should 
be interpreted as English suggests, we believe no deference is 
owed to that interpretation because it conflicts with the text of 
the statute.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 
2781 (1984).  Here, Congress directed that state requirements are 
preempted "which are different from, or in addition to, any 
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requirement under [the FDCA]."  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the mere fact that the FDA has promulgated 
regulations affecting groups of devices, rather than a specific 
type of device, should not alter whether or not there is 
preemption.  See  Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 49 
(D. Mass. 1994) (rejecting FDA's interpretation of preemption 
provision as contrary to statute); Ministry of Health, Province 
of Ontario, Canada v. Shirley Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (C.D. 
Cal. 1994) (same); see also Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1421 n.2 
(interpreting § 360k(a) and § 808.1(d) as announcing "essentially 
the same test"); King, 983 F.2d at 1130 (ruling that § 360k(a) 
provides "maximum protection and express preemption....").   
 Finally, since promulgating § 808.1(d), the FDA has 
issued an interpretation of § 808.1(d) contradictory to the one 
advanced by English.  The FDA has stated:  "[P]reemption is not 
restricted to State requirements that directly conflict with 
Federal law, but rather extends to requirements that are 
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable to 
the device under the act."  45 Fed. Reg. 67,326, 67,328 (1980) 
(emphasis added).  Thus, we conclude that the FDA's labeling and 
good manufacturing practices regulations establish requirements 
within the meaning of § 360k(a).    
IV.   
 In conclusion, based on our decisions in Gile and 
Michael, we hold that appellants' strict product liability, 
negligence and breach of implied warranty claims are preempted by 
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.  Furthermore, we hold that 
16 
preemption applies even where, as here, a Class III medical 
device is cleared for marketing under the "substantial 
equivalence" exception to the MDA Premarket Approval process.  We 
hold, nonetheless, that the district court erred by granting 
summary judgment in Mentor's favor on appellants' breach of 
express warranty claim.  Under our holding in Michael, such a 
claim is not preempted by the MDA.4  We will reverse and remand 
the cause for further proceedings on this claim. 
                                                           
4For the reasons stated, we also remand Mrs. English's loss of 
consortium claim; however, we affirm summary judgment on 
appellants' claim for punitive damages. 
